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Abstract: Using panel data of 57 countries during the period of 1995-2012, this study investigates the 
impact of intellectual property rights (IPR) processes on productivity growth. The IPR processes are 
decomposed into three stages, innovation process, commercialization process, and IPR protection 
process. Our results suggest that better IPR protection is directly associated with productivity 
improvement only in developed economies. In addition, the contribution of IPR processes on growth 
through foreign direct investment (FDI) appears to be very limited. Only FDI inflows in developed 
countries which help to create a better innovative capability lead to a higher growth. And in 
connection with FDI outflows, only IPR protection and commercialization processes are proven to 
improve productivity in the case of developing countries, particularly when the country acts as the 
investing country. 
Keywords: Foreign direct investment, Intellectual property rights, Productivity growth 
JEL Classification: F23, O34 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 FDI has been a critical component for the economic development process in most 
developing economies. Fundamentally it points to the fact that FDI would not only 
develop and utilise idle resources, but also use all the available resources more 
                                                 
§ This research was conducted as part of a project of the Institute of Developing Economies 
“Comprehensive Analysis on Consequence of Trade and Investment Liberalization in East Asia”. We 
would like to thank seminar participants at Institute of Developing Economies for their invaluable 
comments. 
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efficiently. Contributions by FDI to the growth of national output and economic 
efficiency improvement have been the focal points of previous and recent studies to 
reassure that FDI is a viable choice for the FDI-host country. In an attempt to provide 
some empirical illustration, growth in national output led by FDI has been a popular 
measurement choice and encouraging evidence to support FDI pursuing policies that is 
widely used by the host countries, especially those that offer FDI incentives.  
It has been widely argued that FDI is complementary to growth in the host 
countries. Influx of FDI is empirically illustrated as a major factor supporting job creation 
and efficiency improvement in the host economies. Providing the supply of essential 
capital needed for economic development is perhaps just another primary role of FDI, as 
many countries also look for greater economic benefits in terms of technology transfer; 
i.e., the so called “Spillover effect”, to help them move up the value chain. Such positive 
external aspects bring many factors into consideration about whether FDI can live up to 
its expectations. In this connection, IPR protection has received a great deal of attention. 
It was argued, to some extent, that the positive contribution of FDI on growth is even in 
doubt depending on the stage of IPR development. Generally, the arguments on the role 
of IPR on productivity enhancement led by FDI are twofold. A direct channel explains 
that a tightening of IPR would create a better investment environment for a technology-
intensive or knowledge-intensive sector so that, through a suitable technology transfer 
mechanism, it helps accelerate output growth. In one sense, this implies a greater vertical 
FDI type, which means FDI for different products in the host country from those 
produced in the home country. The other possibility involves simply changing the IPR 
regulations to attract greater FDI inflows.  An increase of FDI in a host country creates 
more opportunities for economies of scale. Moreover, an increase in FDI also encourages 
a more efficient allocation and utilisation of resources, thus a higher output growth 
potential. 
This paper aims to focus on the contribution of FDI to improving competitiveness 
by the host country through improving productivity. In addition, we are also interested in 
identifying some of the crucial intellectual property right (IPR) aspects together with both 
inward and outward FDI that help to promote long-run competitiveness and ensure a 
better and sustainable economic development in the future. Furthermore, we are 
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also interested to investigate how the interaction between FDI (inward and outward) and 
IPR may impact productivity growth. For instance, is it true to say that the greater 
innovation capability of a country will attract more FDI and thus, promote growth in 
output? Or, considering the case of outward FDI, does investing in a country with better 
innovative capability lead to productivity improvement in the FDI’s home economy? If 
that is the case, the destination of outward FDI ought to be concentrated more toward 
highly technologically advanced economies.  
While most of the previous studies concentrated mainly on IPR protection, the 
contribution of the role of intellectual property rights (IPR) in this study considers the 
differences in the IPR process consisting of the 1) Innovation process, 2) 
Commercialisation process, and 3) IPR protection process. In each of these processes it is 
hypothesized that there will be a different impact on productivity enhancement through 
FDI inflows and outflows. Ambiguous effects have been discovered in earlier studies. 
Kashcheeva (2013), for instance, reported that, while positive impacts of IPR on 
productivity improvement in the host economy are confirmed, providing a stricter IPR 
environment in the host country does not guarantee productivity enhancement via FDI. In 
fact, it was pointed out that the level of FDI in the host economy was proved to be 
essential. A general equilibrium analysis has indicated a possibility that a stricter IPR 
might have an adverse effect on output growth and certainly on the rate of growth.  
In this study, three variables are applied to illustrate the impact of each of the IPR 
processes on the host and home country’s productivity growth in terms of the stock of 
inward and outward FDI respectively. Firstly, the number of patents per resident is used 
to represent the degree of innovation capability of the host country as the first stage of the 
IPR process. A country with a greater IPR innovation capability is considered to be a so 
called "IPR producer", with a positive impact on output growth expected, and an increase 
in the number of innovations should be positive, or at least not harmful, for economic 
growth. However, there is also the possibility of a diminishing factor as more innovations 
are introduced. The marginal benefit obtained from innovation activities in terms of 
output growth may decrease as the earlier innovations appear to achieve a greater leap in 
value creation.  
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Secondly, the degree to which innovations translate into greater production in the 
economy (and also economic value added) and the IPR commercialisation process is 
represented by the ease of (or the amount of activities) knowledge transfer between 
universities and the private sector. Better links between the two entities indicate 
successful communication and a healthy IPR development that is expected to promote 
productivity growth.  
Finally, the protection process is the stage of IPR development widely considered 
in literature as the key element that is essential to improve a nation’s competitiveness in 
the long-run. Basically, it is argued that a stricter protection scheme supports the growth 
in output. However, the empirical evidence has not shown solid support for this 
argument. For example, it is argued that for a user of new technology, a tighter IPR 
protection means that it is more costly to obtain access to advanced and up to date 
production technology and this makes it more difficult to use existing innovations as a 
basis for further creative activities.  
 
 
2. Methodology 
This study employs a variation of the Alfaro et al (2009) model that was 
originally used to examine the role of FDI on growth in financial markets. The model is 
modified in a way that can capture the effects of the intellectual property rights process 
on TFP growth via two main channels. Firstly, the intellectual property rights may have a 
direct relationship with TFP growth, as IPR development on its own is a productivity 
enhancement activity. Greater innovation achievements, smoother transfer of knowledge 
(or better links between IPR producers and IPR users), and a tighter IPR protection 
scheme, are expected to improve national output growth. Some even have high hopes for 
IPR development as a mechanism essential for developing economies to pull themselves 
out of the “Middle income trap”, by building up more economic value added activities 
and moving up the global value chain.  
For the second channel, IPR may have an indirect effect on growth through 
interaction with FDI that affects the relationship between FDI and growth. This perhaps 
rests on the fact that a more suitable IPR environment might be able to attract more FDI 
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flows, both inward and outward. As a result, this may lead to a higher growth rate of 
output by realizing the benefits of economies of scale and more efficient utilization of 
production resources. In addition, with a better IPR environment, perhaps the types of 
FDI that is attracted may generate higher economic value added and greater positive FDI 
spillover, which will help improve the country’s competitiveness and stimulate economic 
growth.    
Hence, the model presented in this paper has TFP growth as a dependent variable, 
and the variables of interest included are the intellectual property rights (IPR) policy 
variables and their corresponding interaction terms with FDI , as regressors. In particular, 
it is presented in the following form: 
ititititititit PolicyFDIPolicyFDIXTFPgrowth εβββββ +++++=
(?)
4
(?)
3210 *  
where i represents a country and t is a time period. β s are the estimated coefficients; and 
itε  is the error term.  
The TFPgrowth variable corresponds to the growth rate of TFP. X is the set of 
control variables including the share of the non-agricultural sector as a percentage of 
GDP ( NonAgri ), level of development, measured by real GDP per capita (GDPPC ), 
size of population (in millions) ( POP ), domestic credit in the private sector as a 
percentage of GDP (Credit ), inflation rate ( Inflation ), share of government 
consumption as a percentage of GDP (GOV ), trade openness measured by the sum of 
export and import as a percentage of GDP (Openness ), and the local institutional quality 
in which the rule of law index ( RuleofLaw ) is used as a proxy.  
FDI  is the FDI stock as a percentage of GDP. Both FDI inflows and outflows are 
investigated since they may have different effects on productivity growth. In terms of the 
relationship between FDI and productivity growth, the existing empirical literature found 
ambiguous results. The positive effect of FDI on growth is conditional on local 
conditions and policies (such as, the policy environment, human capital, local financial 
markets, market strictness, etc.)1. For instance, Lipsey (2002) came to the conclusion that 
there is no confirmed correlation between FDI (stocks or flows) and output growth. A 
                                                 
1 For recent literature review on the relationship between FDI and productivity, see Alfaro et al (2009), 
Moran (2007). 
 6 
 
“micro-level” analysis was conducted by Görg and Greenaway (2004) that found a 
negative impact from the FDI spillover effect. Besides, Aitken and Harrison (1999) 
argued that there can be a negative effect of FDI on the productivity of domestically 
owned plants due to the competition effect occasioned by the entry of MNEs.  
To investigate the impact of IPR on productivity enhancement, a set of IPR 
related variables is introduced, such that the role of each IPR process in stimulating 
production growth in an economy can be monitored. The three IPR related indicators are: 
1) Intellectual property rights (IPR) (as a proxy of the IPR protection process), 2) The 
number of patents granted to residents (PATENT) (as a proxy of the IPR innovation 
process), and 3) Knowledge transfer (KTRANSER) (as a proxy of the IPR 
commercialization process). All are drawn from the IMD’s World Competitiveness 
Yearbook 2013. The IPR and KTRANSER indicators are based on the executive opinion 
survey response to the survey questions, “Are intellectual property rights adequately 
enforced?” and “Is knowledge transfer highly developed between companies and 
universities?”. As stated, the existing empirical findings on the relationship between IPR 
and productivity growth are not entirely unambiguous. Hence, it is the focus of this study 
to explore this relationship for both the direct and indirect channels (through the 
interaction with FDI). 
 
 
3. Data and Empirical Issues 
  Since unbalanced panel data from 57 countries during the period of 1995-2012 is 
used, the Hausman (1978) specification test was employed to test whether a fixed effect 
or random effect model specification is more appropriate. The result from the Hausman 
test rejected the null hypothesis, in which the estimated coefficients between the two 
estimators were statistically indifferent, and suggested the fixed-effect model estimator. 
In order to control both the potential serial correlation and heteroskedasticity problems, a 
fixed effect model with a robust covariance matrix is selected as the main estimator. In 
addition, since estimation results for developed and developing countries could vary 
substantially, the TFP growth model is estimated for both developed- and developing-
country datasets for the purpose of comparative analysis.  
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In summary, this study estimates the TFP growth model by using a fixed effect 
model with a robust covariance matrix estimator and with three datasets: the “all-
country”, “developing-country”, and “developed-country” datasets2. The estimation 
results are reported in Tables 1 to 6. Tables 1 to 3 focus on the effects of FDI inflows; 
whereas, the effects of FDI outflows are shown in Tables 4 to 6. Column (1) in all the 
tables is the basic specification (with no IPR indicators). In columns (2), (4), and (6), the 
IPR indicators are added in the set of regressors with no interaction term. Finally, the IPR 
indicators with the interaction term (for the FDI and IPR indicators) are presented in 
columns (3), (5), and (7). The estimation results are discussed and presented in the 
section below. 
 
 
4. Empirical Findings 
For the set of control variables, the basic estimation results (column 1 in Tables 1 
to 6) show that the share of the non-agricultural sector, level of development, domestic 
credit, inflation, government consumption, and trade openness have some impact on TFP 
growth. While trade openness appears to have a robust positive impact, the coefficient of 
inflation is negative and significant, suggesting that a higher inflation rate would result in 
a lower TFP growth rate. For the share of the non-agricultural sector, level of 
development, domestic credit, and government consumption, the estimated coefficients, 
although, are significant in some regressions, but they are not robustly significant 
depending upon the country’s dataset in use and/or the choice of explanatory variables 
(FDI inflows or outflows) included in the model. Finally, the population size and local 
institutional quality are found to be insignificant. 
 
4.1 Effects of FDI Inflows  
Based on the estimation results in Tables 1 to 3, FDI inflows turn out to have a 
negative effect on TFP growth. This finding may reflect a concave relationship. As FDI 
inflows increase, the productivity gains (or improvements) from FDI diminish. The 
finding once again suggests that the benefits obtained by the host country in terms of 
                                                 
2 The list of 57 countries and data sources for all variables is reported in Appendix A. 
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output growth depend on the level of FDI inflows. An inward FDI flow in the early stage 
appears to have a larger positive impact on growth. As the level of FDI flow into the host 
country increases, the marginal benefit tends to reduce. However, this negative 
relationship is not robust and significant in all regressions (except when the developing 
countries’ dataset was used). This non-robust relationship between FDI inflows and 
growth corresponds with the findings from Alfaro et al (2009) and Lipsey (2002), in 
which the relationship is ambiguous depending on the influence of other factors, such as 
the level of human capital (Borensztein et al, 1998) and the development of the domestic 
financial market (Alfaro et al, 2009). In this study, the focus is on the role of the IPR 
process, especially the role of inward and outward FDI flows on productivity growth.  
When the IPR policy indicators are added without the interaction term (columns 
(2), (4), and (6)), the IPR and knowledge transfer appear to have a positive and 
significant effect on TFP growth according to the all-country dataset, but only the effects 
of the IPR indicator remain significant according to the developed-country dataset. This 
finding indicates that providing more IPR protection for investors can significantly 
induce growth in developed countries. This is perhaps because better IPR protection 
creates more suitable conditions for technological transfer and technology development 
that would enhance growth. Developed economies are considered to have a higher 
innovative capability, in which investment may be used to finance high technology 
activities. Hence, the relationship between IPR protection and growth appears stronger in 
developed countries.  
On the contrary, all IPR policy indicators seem to have no significant impact on 
TFP growth in developing countries. As an IPR user, not a main producer, developing 
countries tend to have less incentive to provide IPR protection. Although improving IPR 
protection helps increase the value of input used in a country imposing stricter IPR 
protection as it enhances technology transfer, it may increase the cost of accessing or 
utilizing such updated innovative knowledge.  
Next, after the inclusion of the interaction terms of the FDI and IPR policy 
indicators, only the interaction of FDI inflows with the number of patent indicators is 
significant and positive at 10 per cent in the all-country and developed country datasets. 
This suggests that a developed country with a higher number of patents granted is in a 
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better position to seize the benefits from FDI promoting productivity growth. Hence, a 
higher number of patents can lead to a positive FDI spillover in developed countries. 
However, none of the interaction terms appear significant in developing countries. 
 
4.2 Effects of FDI Outflows 
Column 1 in Tables 4 to 6 illustrates that the estimated coefficient of FDI 
outflows is significant and negative. Even after the IPR policy indicators (without 
interaction term) are added (columns 2, 4, and 6) the negative and significant coefficient 
of FDI outflows remains robust in most regressions (except column (4) in Table 6). This 
finding strengthens the view for the concave relationship between FDI and growth. For 
the coefficient on the IPR policy indicators, only the IPR indicator (column 2) is shown 
to have a positive and significant effect on TFP growth in the all-country and developed-
country datasets. This finding indicates the important role of IPR protection for 
productivity growth in developed countries. 
When considering the interaction of FDI outflows with IPR policy indicators 
(Columns 3, 5, 7), these interactions appear to have no significant impact on TFP growth 
according to the developed-country dataset. On the contrary, the interaction of FDI 
outflows with the IPR and knowledge transfer indicators have a significant positive effect 
on growth when the dataset of the developing countries is employed. It suggests that 
better levels of IPR protection and knowledge transfer between companies and 
universities benefit developing countries through positive FDI spillover enhancing 
productivity growth. 
 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
The study found a reverse relationship for both inward and outward FDI flows on 
productivity improvement. An increase in FDI inflows and outflows has a negative effect 
on the rate of productivity growth, which suggests a concave relationship; i.e., the 
possibility of a diminishing return of scale for production growth created by FDI.  
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A Summary of the Effect of the IPR Process on Productivity Growth  
Stage of Economic 
Development  
IPR Process 
Innovation  Commercialization Protection  
Developed Economy X X (+) 
Developing Economy X X X 
Note: X = There is no significant effect on growth; (+) = Indicates a robust positive impact of IPR on 
growth.  
 
Better IPR protection contributes positively to productivity improvement in 
developed economies. Whereas, innovative capability and knowledge transfer are found 
to have some impact on growth, but the relationships are not robustly significant. The 
effects of all three IPR processes directly affecting growth are rated weak and ambiguous 
in developing countries. The results suggest that improving the IPR protection 
environment in a developing country does not guarantee greater productivity growth, as 
the increasing cost of accessing the available technology and know-how eliminates the 
positive gains from protection. The IPR commercialization process and innovation 
capability also have a limiting effect on output growth in developing economies. This 
raises the question about the effectiveness of how innovation can be translated into 
marketable products and how developing economies should conduct their IPR related 
policies. In addition, innovation has not been proven to be beneficial for productivity 
enhancement, which could be linked to the fact that most developing nations have not 
been able to generate new technology consistent with the comparative advantages. More 
convincing evidence is seen for developed economies where IPR protection activities are 
shown to stimulate growth.  
 
    A Summary of the Effect of the IPR Process on Productivity Growth through FDI  
Stage of Economic 
Development  
IPR Process through FDI inflows 
Innovation  Commercialization Protection  
Developed Economy (+) X X 
Developing Economy X X X 
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Stage of Economic 
Development  
IPR Process through FDI outflows 
Innovation  Commercialization Protection  
Developed Economy X X X 
Developing Economy X (+) (+) 
Note: X = There is no significant effect on growth; (+) = Indicates a robust positive impact of IPR on 
growth.  
 
The contribution of IPR processes on growth through FDI flows appears rather 
ambiguous as the benefits seem to be associated more with firms that invest abroad. The 
possibility of productivity enhancement in the host country through inward FDI is very 
limited as the results suggest that only the inflow of FDI in developed countries which 
helping to create a better innovative capability lives up to expectations. In connection 
with FDI outflows, only IPR protection and IPR commercialization (through FDI 
outflow) are proven to improve productivity in the case of developing nations, 
particularly when the country acts as the investing country.  
Although having a small impact, the contribution of IPR through inward and 
outward flows of FDI in developed and developing economies is also shown to be 
different. Inward FDI in developed economies is more likely to show a vertical FDI and 
thus lead to improved innovative capability. In developing economies, inward FDI flows 
tend to be horizontal and there are cases where FDI that brought in production technology 
that is not consistent with the host country’s comparative advantage has led to a less than 
efficient production in the long-run. Greater inflows of FDI, rather than building 
innovative capability in the host economies, inherit a so called “buying technology” habit 
or mentality which, in the long-run, limits the country’s greater productivity 
improvement. 
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Table 1. Regression results, FDI inflows, all countries, dependent variable: TFP growth 
 (1) Basic (2) Policy= 
IPR 
(3) Policy= 
IPR 
(4) Policy= 
Patent 
(5) Policy= 
Patent 
(6) Policy= 
KTransfer 
(7) Policy= 
KTransfer 
NonAgri -0.1992 -0.1518 -0.1496 -0.2753 -0.2662 -0.1748 -0.1702 
 (0.1089)* (0.1167) (0.1157) (0.1987) (0.1958) (0.1156) (0.1164) 
lnGDPPC -1.7667 -0.2526 -0.0220 -3.5427 -3.5704 -0.2476 -0.1855 
 (1.7127) (1.5300) (1.5916) (2.1836) (2.1722) (1.4862) (1.5594) 
lnPOP 2.5680 3.1066 2.4593 -1.1413 -1.2542 1.6999 1.5405 
 (2.3568) (3.1241) (3.0766) (2.3198) (2.2824) (3.0943) (3.1391) 
Credit -0.0266 -0.0238 -0.0233 -0.0256 -0.0263 -0.0256 -0.0255 
 (0.0099)*** (0.0084)*** (0.0084)*** (0.0159) (0.0160) (0.0083)*** (0.0083)*** 
Inflation -0.1180 -0.1013 -0.1069 -0.2239 -0.2229 -0.0998 -0.1017 
 (0.0343)*** (0.0633) (0.0648) (0.0684)*** (0.0683)*** (0.0639) (0.0660) 
GOV -0.1687 -0.2635 -0.2705 -0.3521 -0.3577 -0.2463 -0.2479 
 (0.0573)*** (0.0851)*** (0.0831)*** (0.0963)*** (0.0959)*** (0.0795)*** (0.0788)*** 
Openness 0.0647 0.0545 0.0524 0.0724 0.0729 0.0545 0.0537 
 (0.0118)*** (0.0112)*** (0.0115)*** (0.0223)*** (0.0222)*** (0.0114)*** (0.0122)*** 
RuleofLaw -0.9144 0.0889 -0.0379 -0.2485 -0.2511 0.3349 0.2418 
 (1.0978) (1.0009) (0.9826) (1.6248) (1.6158) (1.0133) (1.0790) 
FDIin -0.0163 -0.0158 -0.0550 -0.0236 -0.0265 -0.0160 -0.0250 
 (0.0065)* (0.0058)*** (0.0576) (0.0081)*** (0.0091)*** (0.0060)* (0.0500) 
Policy  0.4812 0.3202 0.0000 -0.0000 0.3604 0.3097 
  (0.2185)* (0.3108) (0.0000) (0.0000)* (0.1884)* (0.2675) 
FDIin*Policy   0.0055  0.0000  0.0015 
   (0.0074)  (0.0000)*  (0.0076) 
Constant 29.7331 7.5129 8.6251 67.5114 67.3059 14.9034 14.8422 
 (13.3336)* (10.1405) (9.3756) (21.9102)*** (21.8595)*** (9.9966) (9.9287) 
R2 0.20 0.17 0.18 0.19 0.20 0.17 0.17 
Observation 671 608 608 481 481 608 608 
No. of countries 57 57 57 57 57 57 57 
Notes:  Figures in parentheses are robust standard errors. ***, **, * indicate significance levels at 1%, 5%, 10%, respectively. 
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Table 2. Regression results, FDI inflows, developed countries, dependent variable: TFP growth 
 (1) Basic (2) Policy= 
IPR 
(3) Policy= 
IPR 
(4) Policy= 
Patent 
(5) Policy= 
Patent 
(6) Policy= 
KTransfer 
(7) Policy= 
KTransfer 
NonAgri -0.0759 0.0405 0.0415 -0.6868 -0.6749 -0.0211 -0.0397 
 (0.1868) (0.1827) (0.1817) (0.6958) (0.6912) (0.1903) (0.1903) 
lnGDPPC -4.6870 -3.4059 -3.4727 -6.1888 -6.6289 -3.1968 -3.7037 
 (2.4071)* (2.5872) (2.7118) (4.6818) (4.6208) (2.5209) (2.7959) 
lnPOP 0.1755 -0.0405 0.2545 -4.0377 -4.1562 -1.1333 -0.1594 
 (1.2686) (2.8120) (3.1733) (1.9045)* (1.9285)* (2.9705) (3.3040) 
Credit -0.0166 -0.0154 -0.0155 -0.0110 -0.0114 -0.0174 -0.0176 
 (0.0091)* (0.0082)* (0.0082)* (0.0101) (0.0102) (0.0084)* (0.0086)* 
Inflation -0.1985 -0.1485 -0.1416 -0.3110 -0.3060 -0.1574 -0.1328 
 (0.0592)*** (0.0764)* (0.0709)* (0.0565)*** (0.0580)*** (0.0797)* (0.0772)* 
GOV -0.1396 -0.2798 -0.2788 -0.5123 -0.5248 -0.2423 -0.2490 
 (0.1253) (0.1320)* (0.1312)* (0.1623)*** (0.1616)*** (0.1289)* (0.1327)* 
Openness 0.0697 0.0655 0.0661 0.0642 0.0653 0.0650 0.0689 
 (0.0145)*** (0.0148)*** (0.0155)*** (0.0290)* (0.0289)* (0.0150)*** (0.0171)*** 
RuleofLaw -0.3556 -0.1960 -0.1861 0.0015 0.0782 0.2226 0.6834 
 (1.7157) (1.6733) (1.6670) (2.4964) (2.4900) (1.6811) (1.6507) 
FDIin -0.0115 -0.0125 -0.0022 -0.0159 -0.0185 -0.0122 0.0236 
 (0.0048)* (0.0045)*** (0.0443) (0.0056)*** (0.0068)* (0.0047)* (0.0357) 
Policy  0.6559 0.7094 0.0000 -0.0000 0.2881 0.5031 
  (0.2336)*** (0.3264)* (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.1858) (0.2776)* 
FDIin*Policy   -0.0014  0.0000  -0.0059 
   (0.0061)  (0.0000)*  (0.0060) 
Constant 53.5260 27.8707 27.2430 145.2400 148.7843 36.5843 38.8450 
 (26.7213)* (26.9476) (26.2563) (66.5196)* (65.7850)* (27.1287) (28.9745) 
R2 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.17 0.17 
Observation 437 410 410 312 312 410 410 
No. of countries -0.0759 0.0405 0.0415 -0.6868 -0.6749 -0.0211 -0.0397 
Notes: Figures in parentheses are robust standard errors. ***, **, * indicate significance levels at 1%, 5%, 10%, respectively. 
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Table 3. Regression results, FDI inflows, developing countries, dependent variable: TFP growth 
 
 (1) Basic (2) Policy= 
IPR 
(3) Policy= 
IPR 
(4) Policy= 
Patent 
(5) Policy= 
Patent 
(6) Policy= 
KTransfer 
(7) Policy= 
KTransfer 
NonAgri -0.0760 -0.1688 -0.1700 -0.0244 -0.0146 -0.1644 -0.1069 
 (0.0930) (0.1052) (0.1073) (0.1412) (0.1392) (0.1018) (0.1100) 
lnGDPPC -0.0039 2.2555 2.0875 -1.4239 -2.2419 2.2002 1.4959 
 (2.1196) (2.7594) (2.9326) (4.4319) (3.7980) (3.0844) (3.1685) 
lnPOP 3.2605 3.7750 5.6523 7.9370 9.4222 4.3526 6.6509 
 (5.4442) (6.4311) (6.2753) (8.1581) (7.9548) (7.4388) (6.7837) 
Credit -0.1051 -0.0853 -0.0861 -0.1024 -0.0992 -0.0896 -0.0856 
 (0.0274)*** (0.0255)*** (0.0235)*** (0.0339)*** (0.0319)*** (0.0244)*** (0.0242)*** 
Inflation -0.1052 -0.1067 -0.1055 -0.1968 -0.2001 -0.1075 -0.1149 
 (0.0358)*** (0.0638) (0.0593)* (0.0929)* (0.0986)* (0.0654) (0.0630)* 
GOV -0.2847 -0.3327 -0.3105 -0.4260 -0.4257 -0.3211 -0.3428 
 (0.0595)*** (0.1041)*** (0.0906)*** (0.0779)*** (0.0803)*** (0.0949)*** (0.0942)*** 
Openness 0.0749 0.0595 0.0558 0.1095 0.1074 0.0635 0.0677 
 (0.0255)*** (0.0257)* (0.0261)* (0.0306)*** (0.0283)*** (0.0249)* (0.0244)* 
RuleofLaw 1.2843 1.9703 1.8139 0.9589 0.9838 2.4540 2.2783 
 (1.4146) (1.2517) (1.1491) (2.0970) (2.0199) (1.0145)* (0.9332)* 
FDIin -0.0515 -0.0962 -0.2462 -0.0648 -0.0574 -0.0883 -0.2149 
 (0.0225)* (0.0354)* (0.1110)* (0.0264)* (0.0217)* (0.0323)* (0.1097)* 
Policy  0.4110 -0.3354 -0.0000 0.0001 -0.0703 -0.9968 
  (0.4324) (0.6475) (0.0000) (0.0002) (0.4820) (0.8291) 
FDIin*Policy   0.0290  -0.0000  0.0304 
   (0.0197)  (0.0000)  (0.0254) 
Constant 2.3878 -10.1737 -12.9808 -9.2555 -9.5344 -10.7721 -16.3875 
 (14.9290) (13.0249) (13.3738) (25.1099) (24.8619) (18.4963) (15.1561) 
R2 0.36 0.31 0.33 0.32 0.32 0.30 0.32 
Observation 234 198 198 169 169 198 198 
No. of countries 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 
Notes: Figures in parentheses are robust standard errors. ***, **, * indicate significance levels at 1%, 5%, 10%, respectively. 
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Table 4. Regression results, FDI outflows, all countries, dependent variable: TFP growth 
 
 (1) Basic (2) Policy= 
IPR 
(3) Policy= 
IPR 
(4) Policy= 
Patent 
(5) Policy= 
Patent 
(6) Policy= 
KTransfer 
(7) Policy= 
KTransfer 
NonAgri -0.2143 -0.1598 -0.1583 -0.2899 -0.2899 -0.1830 -0.1813 
 (0.1178)* (0.1213) (0.1217) (0.2122) (0.2126) (0.1206) (0.1215) 
lnGDPPC -1.8953 -0.2797 -0.2406 -4.1593 -4.0771 -0.3132 -0.2954 
 (1.7923) (1.6418) (1.6729) (2.3112)* (2.3226)* (1.5891) (1.6132) 
lnPOP 2.4255 2.8743 2.7272 -1.1605 -1.1958 1.5428 1.5248 
 (2.3127) (3.1819) (3.2626) (2.4725) (2.4712) (3.1660) (3.1807) 
Credit -0.0255 -0.0219 -0.0219 -0.0213 -0.0214 -0.0236 -0.0236 
 (0.0101)* (0.0084)* (0.0084)* (0.0166) (0.0166) (0.0084)*** (0.0083)*** 
Inflation -0.1129 -0.0969 -0.0977 -0.2188 -0.2188 -0.0957 -0.0963 
 (0.0332)*** (0.0613) (0.0621) (0.0680)*** (0.0684)*** (0.0625) (0.0631) 
GOV -0.1529 -0.2625 -0.2639 -0.3542 -0.3578 -0.2450 -0.2454 
 (0.0553)*** (0.0859)*** (0.0852)*** (0.1038)*** (0.1046)*** (0.0803)*** (0.0802)*** 
Openness 0.0566 0.0488 0.0482 0.0710 0.0707 0.0495 0.0493 
 (0.0118)*** (0.0122)*** (0.0125)*** (0.0215)*** (0.0216)*** (0.0122)*** (0.0125)*** 
RuleofLaw -0.9717 0.2060 0.1962 0.0218 0.0158 0.4617 0.4354 
 (1.1201) (0.9762) (0.9730) (1.6774) (1.6768) (0.9973) (1.0092) 
FDIout -0.0089 -0.0109 -0.0219 -0.0194 -0.0201 -0.0118 -0.0158 
 (0.0051)* (0.0051)* (0.0422) (0.0060)*** (0.0060)*** (0.0051)* (0.0386) 
Policy  0.4977 0.4672 0.0000 -0.0000 0.3666 0.3481 
  (0.2277)* (0.2609)* (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.1886)* (0.2339) 
FDIout*Policy   0.0015  0.0000  0.0007 
   (0.0057)  (0.0000)  (0.0060) 
Constant 32.8276 9.0454 9.2594 73.8657 73.2997 16.5756 16.4564 
 (14.1110)* (10.4467) (10.2513) (23.3737)*** (23.4387)*** (10.1536) (10.2563) 
R2 0.19 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.16 0.16 
Observation 663 604 604 474 474 604 604 
No. of countries 57 57 57 57 57 57 57 
Notes: Figures in parentheses are robust standard errors. ***, **, * indicate significance levels at 1%, 5%, 10%, respectively. 
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Table 5. Regression results, FDI outflows, developed countries, dependent variable: TFP growth 
 
 (1) Basic (2) Policy= 
IPR 
(3) Policy= 
IPR 
(4) Policy= 
Patent 
(5) Policy= 
Patent 
(6) Policy= 
KTransfer 
(7) Policy= 
KTransfer 
NonAgri -0.0866 0.0335 0.0310 -0.7065 -0.6847 -0.0278 -0.0324 
 (0.1894) (0.1839) (0.1855) (0.7064) (0.7108) (0.1919) (0.1943) 
lnGDPPC -5.4560 -4.2113 -4.2368 -7.3172 -7.5928 -4.0118 -4.0680 
 (2.4767)* (2.6208) (2.6867) (4.7055) (4.7519) (2.5567) (2.6555) 
lnPOP 0.3383 0.5803 0.7395 -3.8566 -3.8922 -0.4515 -0.3877 
 (1.3444) (2.9371) (3.1570) (1.9164)* (1.9162)* (3.0147) (3.0923) 
Credit -0.0129 -0.0114 -0.0114 -0.0052 -0.0051 -0.0134 -0.0135 
 (0.0091) (0.0082) (0.0083) (0.0096) (0.0096) (0.0083) (0.0084) 
Inflation -0.2019 -0.1571 -0.1536 -0.3131 -0.3102 -0.1663 -0.1627 
 (0.0619)*** (0.0815)* (0.0762)* (0.0530)*** (0.0543)*** (0.0848)* (0.0806)* 
GOV -0.1448 -0.2909 -0.2903 -0.5261 -0.5378 -0.2553 -0.2565 
 (0.1255) (0.1330)* (0.1327)* (0.1611)*** (0.1627)*** (0.1301)* (0.1314)* 
Openness 0.0737 0.0708 0.0713 0.0714 0.0717 0.0708 0.0715 
 (0.0141)*** (0.0148)*** (0.0152)*** (0.0308)* (0.0309)* (0.0151)*** (0.0157)*** 
RuleofLaw -0.2415 0.1210 0.1063 0.1987 0.2710 0.5384 0.5992 
 (1.7267) (1.6429) (1.6638) (2.5061) (2.5093) (1.6470) (1.6262) 
FDIout -0.0132 -0.0152 -0.0071 -0.0190 -0.0202 -0.0155 -0.0079 
 (0.0054)* (0.0055)*** (0.0450) (0.0068)*** (0.0072)*** (0.0056)*** (0.0409) 
Policy  0.6313 0.6678 0.0000 -0.0000 0.2945 0.3447 
  (0.2315)*** (0.3054)* (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.1854) (0.2821) 
FDIout*Policy   -0.0011  0.0000  -0.0013 
   (0.0061)  (0.0000)  (0.0064) 
Constant 61.1085 34.2222 34.0227 156.7924 157.6776 42.6449 43.1050 
 (26.8414)* (26.1870) (26.0139) (65.8823)* (65.5544)* (26.3013) (27.1765) 
R2 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.20 0.17 0.17 
Observation 437 410 410 312 312 410 410 
No. of countries 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 
Notes: Figures in parentheses are robust standard errors. ***, **, * indicate significance levels at 1%, 5%, 10%, respectively. 
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Table 6. Regression results, FDI outflows, developing countries, dependent variable: TFP growth 
 
 (1) Basic (2) Policy= 
IPR 
(3) Policy= 
IPR 
(4) Policy= 
Patent 
(5) Policy= 
Patent 
(6) Policy= 
KTransfer 
(7) Policy= 
KTransfer 
NonAgri -0.1322 -0.1936 -0.1829 -0.0522 -0.0511 -0.1865 -0.1062 
 (0.1000) (0.1210) (0.1240) (0.1425) (0.1415) (0.1153) (0.1189) 
lnGDPPC 1.5370 4.3506 4.1249 -1.2116 -1.4902 4.0458 3.0751 
 (2.2061) (2.8308) (2.6190) (4.7124) (4.7913) (3.1647) (3.1495) 
lnPOP 3.9947 1.8358 2.9967 8.8732 8.7661 2.1751 3.3603 
 (5.0110) (6.5344) (6.2726) (9.9467) (10.2555) (7.6117) (7.3593) 
Credit -0.1178 -0.1098 -0.1049 -0.1223 -0.1166 -0.1119 -0.0965 
 (0.0271)*** (0.0291)*** (0.0261)*** (0.0400)*** (0.0391)*** (0.0295)*** (0.0286)*** 
Inflation -0.0838 -0.0855 -0.0854 -0.1671 -0.1578 -0.0881 -0.0945 
 (0.0282)*** (0.0569) (0.0545) (0.0814)* (0.0781)* (0.0589) (0.0593) 
GOV -0.2034 -0.2749 -0.2779 -0.3696 -0.3858 -0.2656 -0.2898 
 (0.0488)*** (0.0949)*** (0.0835)*** (0.0966)*** (0.0874)*** (0.0900)*** (0.0868)*** 
Openness 0.0582 0.0386 0.0458 0.0969 0.0933 0.0447 0.0635 
 (0.0244)* (0.0254) (0.0239)* (0.0278)*** (0.0263)*** (0.0249)* (0.0268)* 
RuleofLaw 1.4915 2.2191 1.9802 1.2262 1.1207 2.6797 2.2305 
 (1.2594) (1.0315)* (1.1700) (1.8000) (1.7049) (1.0000)* (1.1366)* 
FDIout -0.1351 -0.1434 -0.7360 -0.0711 -0.0587 -0.1268 -0.6131 
 (0.0525)* (0.0326)*** (0.2804)* (0.0612) (0.0662) (0.0386)*** (0.2449)* 
Policy  0.4970 0.0900 -0.0000 0.0001 -0.0089 -0.5649 
  (0.4671) (0.5070) (0.0000) (0.0002) (0.5196) (0.5928) 
FDIout*Policy   0.0943  -0.0000  0.0862 
   (0.0413)*  (0.0000)  (0.0408)* 
Constant -8.1150 -17.0188 -19.3378 -12.8559 -10.2673 -14.7729 -18.2611 
 (17.2276) (14.8282) (15.6639) (31.7052) (31.4872) (20.0683) (19.1155) 
R2 0.36 0.30 0.31 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.31 
Observation 226 194 194 162 162 194 194 
No. of countries 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 
Notes: Figures in parentheses are robust standard errors. ***, **, * indicate significance levels at 1%, 5%, 10%, respectively. 
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Table 7. Regression results, FDI inflows and outflows, all countries, dependent variable: TFP growth 
 (1) Baseline (2) Policy= 
IPR 
(3) Policy= 
IPR 
(4) Policy= 
Patent 
(5) Policy= 
Patent 
(6) Policy= 
KTransfer 
(7) Policy= 
KTransfer 
NonAgri -0.1919 -0.1582 -0.1600 -0.2611 -0.2504 -0.1817 -0.1796 
 (0.1010)* (0.1138) (0.1119) (0.1966) (0.1928) (0.1132) (0.1148) 
lnGDPPC -1.5105 0.0657 0.2548 -3.4588 -3.6752 -0.0027 0.0255 
 (1.7057) (1.5569) (1.5917) (2.2960) (2.2626) (1.5239) (1.5817) 
lnPOP 2.3023 2.8042 2.3244 -1.2936 -1.3540 1.4823 1.4948 
 (2.2370) (2.9735) (2.9610) (2.2965) (2.2832) (3.0085) (3.0902) 
Credit -0.0286 -0.0250 -0.0239 -0.0260 -0.0265 -0.0265 -0.0266 
 (0.0099)*** (0.0084)*** (0.0082)*** (0.0162) (0.0163) (0.0084)*** (0.0081)*** 
Inflation -0.1180 -0.0993 -0.1071 -0.2223 -0.2206 -0.0981 -0.0986 
 (0.0340)*** (0.0607) (0.0621)* (0.0690)*** (0.0684)*** (0.0622) (0.0644) 
GOV -0.1756 -0.2617 -0.2685 -0.3612 -0.3623 -0.2427 -0.2430 
 (0.0610)*** (0.0838)*** (0.0804)*** (0.0986)*** (0.0989)*** (0.0784)*** (0.0779)*** 
Openness 0.0619 0.0524 0.0516 0.0705 0.0720 0.0531 0.0527 
 (0.0120)*** (0.0121)*** (0.0122)*** (0.0226)*** (0.0226)*** (0.0121)*** (0.0125)*** 
RuleofLaw -0.8539 0.1719 -0.0811 -0.0781 -0.0752 0.4529 0.4323 
 (1.1049) (0.9984) (0.9948) (1.6403) (1.6315) (1.0188) (1.0702) 
FDIin -0.0247 -0.0214 -0.1004 -0.0250 -0.0279 -0.0195 -0.0158 
 (0.0123)* (0.0126)* (0.0629) (0.0163) (0.0169) (0.0124) (0.0571) 
FDIout 0.0109 0.0067 0.0674 0.0025 0.0022 0.0043 -0.0050 
 (0.0123) (0.0130) (0.0504) (0.0160) (0.0160) (0.0126) (0.0465) 
Policy  0.5364 0.3682 0.0000 -0.0000 0.3687 0.3479 
  (0.2258)* (0.3006) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.1905)* (0.2655) 
FDIin*Policy   0.0111  0.0000  -0.0007 
   (0.0077)  (0.0000)*  (0.0090) 
FDIout*Policy   -0.0085  -0.0000  0.0016 
   (0.0062)  (0.0000)  (0.0072) 
Constant 28.0236 5.9604 7.4545 66.1065 67.1359 13.9605 13.6249 
 (13.0454)* (10.2775) (9.2655) (21.9459)*** (21.8956)*** (10.0482) (10.0817) 
R2 0.20 0.17 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.17 0.17 
Observation 663 604 604 474 474 604 604 
Notes: Figures in parentheses are robust standard errors. ***, **, * indicate significance levels at 1%, 5%, 10%, respectively. 
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APPENDIX A: DATA APPENDIX 
 
Country Lists 
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, 
Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, 
Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Korea, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, 
Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Russia, Singapore, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, 
South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, UAE, Ukraine, United 
Kingdom, USA, Venezuela. 
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Variable and Source 
 
Variable Definition and Source 
TFPgrowth  Growth rate of TFP at constant national prices (2005=1). 
(Source: Penn World Table (PWT) 8.) 
NonAgri  Share of non-agriculture sector as a percentage of GDP 
(Source: IMD’s World Competitiveness Yearbook, 2013.) 
GDPPC  Real GDP per capita (constant 2005 US$). 
(Source: World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI).) 
POP  Population (in millions). 
(Source: Penn World Table (PWT) 8.) 
Credit  Domestic credit to private sector as a percentage of GDP.  
(Source: World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI).) 
Inflation  Inflation rate, consumer prices (annual %). 
(Source: World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI).) 
GOV  Share of government consumption as a percentage of GDP. 
(Source: Penn World Table (PWT) 8.) 
Openness  Trade openness, measured by the sum of export and import as a percentage 
of GDP.  
(Source: World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI).) 
RuleofLaw  Rule of law indicator. 
(Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI).) 
FDIin  FDI stock (inflow) as a percentage of GDP. 
(Source: UNCTAD.) 
FDIout  FDI stock (outflow) as a percentage of GDP. 
(Source: UNCTAD.) 
IPR Intellectual property rights indicator. 
(Source: IMD’s World Competitiveness Yearbook, 2013.) 
PATENT Number of patents granted to residents indicators. 
(Source: IMD’s World Competitiveness Yearbook, 2013.) 
KTRANSER Knowledge transfer indicator. 
(Source: IMD’s World Competitiveness Yearbook, 2013.) 
 
